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GRADING AG SZPUNAR’S OPINION IN CASE
C-18/18 – A CAUTION AGAINST WORLDWIDE
CONTENT BLOCKING AS DEFAULT*
by
DAN SVANTESSON**
On 4th  of June 2019,  Advocate  General  Szpunar delivered  his  Opinion in Case
C-18/18 between Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek (an Austrian politician) and Facebook
Ireland  Limited.  The politician  had  sought  to have  certain  current  and  future
content –  argued  to be  defamatory –  blocked  by Facebook  with  worldwide  effect.
This is arguably the most important Internet speech-related case currently before
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and will doubtlessly influence
court reasoning far beyond Europe.
This Comment analyses AG Szpunar’s interesting, but problematic, Opinion
with  particular  emphasis  on his  reasoning  in relation  to the question  of scope
of jurisdiction; that is, what is the appropriate geographical scope of orders in these
circumstances,  rendered  by a court  that  has  personal  jurisdiction  and  subject
matter jurisdiction.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The dispute  in Case C-18/18 arose  when  Eva  Glawischnig-Piesczek
(an Austrian  politician)  sought  to have  certain  content –  argued  to be
defamatory –  removed by Facebook  Ireland  Limited with  worldwide  effect.
* Professor  Svantesson wrote an Expert Opinion on behalf of Facebook Ireland Limited  in Case
C-18/18.  This  contribution  was  supported  by a grant  from  Facebook  Ireland  Limited  but
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In fact,  she  also  sought  to have  possible  future  postings  containing
statements  with  identical  wording,  and/or  having  equivalent  meaning,
removed  on Facebook  with  worldwide  effect,  regardless  of whether  such
postings were made by the person responsible for the initial posting or any
other current or future Facebook user.
Case C-18/18 is arguably the most important Internet speech-related case
currently  before  the Court  of Justice  of the European  Union  (CJEU) and will
doubtlessly  influence  court  reasoning  far  beyond Europe.  On 4th of June
2019, Advocate General Szpunar delivered his Opinion in the matter.
Scarred  by my  profession,  I  tend  to approach  documents  such  as AG
Szpunar’s Opinion from the perspective of what grade they deserve. Great
papers  are  easy  to mark.  The same  goes  for  particularly  poor  papers.
The hardest are those that are partly good, or very good, and partly poor.
In my  view,  AG  Szpunar's  Opinion  in Case  C-18/18  falls  into  this  latter
category. It is elegant in parts, and messy in others. Clear logical reasoning
is  bundled  with  what  I  see  as inconsistencies,  and  sensible  conclusions
appear next to what, quite frankly, are surprisingly fanciful assertions.
Put  in the simplest  of terms,  AG  Szpunar  addressed  two  themes
of issues:
1. To what  extent  does  Article 15(1)  of the Directive  on electronic
commerce1 limit  blocking  and  monitoring  imposed  under
the national law of a Member State; and
2. What  limits  apply  as to the scope  of jurisdiction  of such  orders?
That  is,  what  is  the appropriate  geographical  scope  of orders
in these  circumstances,  rendered  by a court  that  has  personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction?2
In this brief note, I focus on the latter topic; that of scope of jurisdiction.
However,  I  note  in passing  that,  on the first  matter,  AG  Szpunar  took
the view that the Directive on electronic commerce
1 Directive  2000/31/EC  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 8  June  2000
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce,
in the Internal  Market.  Official  Journal  L  178,  17/07/2000  P.  0001–0016.  Available  from:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EL/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32000L0031&from=EN
[Accessed 2 September 2019].
2 Svantesson,  D.  (2016)  Jurisdiction  in 3D –  “scope  of (remedial)  jurisdiction”  as a third
dimension of jurisdiction. Journal of Private International Law, 12 (1), pp. 60–76.
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“does not preclude a host provider which operates a social network platform
from  being  ordered  […]  to seek  and  identify,  among  all  the information
disseminated  by users  of that  platform,  the information  identical
to the information that has been characterised as illegal by a court”.3
Furthermore,
“a host provider may [also] be ordered to seek and identify the information
equivalent  to that  characterised  as illegal  only  among  the information
disseminated by the user that disseminated that illegal information.”4
While he added that
“[a] court adjudicating on the removal of such equivalent information must
ensure that the effects of its injunction are clear, precise and foreseeable”,5
and that such a court also
“must  weigh  up  the fundamental  rights  involved  and  take  account
of the principle of proportionality”,6
if Szpunar’s  view is  adopted by the CJEU, we have to expect  far  reaching
consequences on free expression and access to information for both Internet
users and for Internet intermediaries. This is especially so if such orders are
worldwide in scope; after all, in that case we would have an Austrian court
deciding what foreigners may post on a foreign social media platform even
where  the content  is  perfectly  legal  both  where  the platform  user  and
platform  are  located.  Such  an intrusive  approach  may  undoubtedly  be
justified in certain extreme situations, but not as a general default position;
and  as framed  in this  Opinion,  it  seems  to be  entirely  at odds  with  AG
Spuznar’s  concern  regarding  a “race  to the bottom”  approach  on free
expression he articulated just a few months earlier.7
3 Opinion of Advocate  General  Szpunar  in Glawischnig-Piesczek (C-18/18,  EU:C:2019:458),
para. 109.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Opinion  of Advocate  General  Szpunar  in Google  (Territorial  scope  of de-referencing)
(C-507/17, EU:C:2019:15).
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2. THE TASK AS AG SZPUNAR SAW IT
On the  topic  in focus  here,  AG  Szpunar  saw  his  task  as clearing  up
the question of
“whether a host provider may be ordered to remove content which has been
characterised as illegal under the national law of a Member State not only
in that Member State but also worldwide.”8
He concluded that:
“As regards the territorial  scope of a removal obligation imposed on a host
provider  in the context  of an injunction, it  should be  considered that  that
obligation  is  not  regulated  either  by Article  15 (1)  of Directive  2000/31
or by any other provision of that directive and that that provision therefore
does  not  preclude  that  host  provider  from  being  ordered  to remove
worldwide information disseminated via a social network platform. Nor is
that  territorial  scope  regulated  by EU  law,  since  in the present  case
the applicant’s action is not based on EU law.”9
In the first  part  of this  paragraph,  AG  Szpunar  is  merely  stating
the obvious; the Directive on electronic commerce clearly does not regulate
the scope of jurisdiction issue. In contrast, his claim that the territorial scope
is not regulated by EU law since the applicant’s action is not based on EU
law is as surprising as it is concerning.
3. THE RELATIONSHIP WITH CASE C-507/17 (GOOGLE 
FRANCE)
In setting the scene for his task, AG Szpunar correctly observed that
1.  “the EU  legislature  has  not  harmonised  the material  rules  on harm
to private life and personality rights, including defamation.”10; and
2. “the EU legislature [has not] harmonised the conflict-of-law rules in that
field.”11
Appropriately, this led him to conclude that
8 Opinion of Advocate  General  Szpunar in Glawischnig-Piesczek  (C-18/18,  EU:C:2019:458),
para. 76.
9 Op. cit., para. 109.
10 Op. cit., para. 78.
11 Ibid.
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“when  hearing  actions  in defamation,  each  court  in the European  Union
applies the law designated as applicable under the national conflict rules.”12 
As is  well-known,  however,  it  is  not  only  customary,  but  logically
necessary,  to address  the matter  of jurisdiction  before  one  enters
the territory of identifying the applicable law. As also is well-known, the EU
legislature has, indeed, harmonised the rules of jurisdiction when it comes
to harm to private life and personality rights, including defamation.13
What then can have motivated this highly skilled private international
law  jurist  to rush  to the question  of choice  of law  first?  The answer  is
perhaps found in the paragraph that follows immediately after this oddity.
There,  AG  Szpunar relies  on the applicable  law  being  national  law
to distinguish  the case  at hand  from  Case C-507/17 (Google  France)
in relation  to which  he  reached  a series  of important  conclusions14 that
potentially could have extended in a similar manner to this case:
“That  case  [Case  C-507/17]  concerns  Directive  95/46/EC15,  […]  which
harmonises, at Union level, certain material rules on data protection. It was,
notably, the fact that the applicable material rules are harmonised that led
me to conclude that a service provider had to be required to delete the results
displayed  following  a search  carried  out  not  only  from a single  Member
State but from a place within the European Union.”16
In this context, AG Szpunar went on to stress that in his Opinion in Case
C-507/17, he
“did  not  exclude  the possibility  that  there  might  be  situations  in which
the interest  of the Union  requires  the application  of the provisions  of that
directive beyond the territory of the European Union.”17
12 Ibid.
13 Regulation  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 12  December  2012
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).
14 Opinion  of Advocate  General  Szpunar  in Google  (Territorial  scope  of de-referencing)
(C-507/17, EU:C:2019:15).
15 Directive  of the European  Parliament  and  of the Council  of 24  October  1995
on the protection  of individuals  with  regard  to the processing  of personal  data  and
on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31).
16 Opinion of Advocate  General  Szpunar  in Glawischnig-Piesczek (C-18/18,  EU:C:2019:458),
para. 79.
17 Ibid.
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Even  in the light  of this  latter  point –  with  which  I  am  entirely
comfortable18 –  it  is  remarkable  that  AG  Szpunar  here  does  not  further
engage with the implications of the distinction between Case  C-507/17 and
the case at hand.
As it  was the fact the relevant substantive law  has been harmonised that
persuaded AG Szpunar  to facilitate EU-wide de-indexing in Case  C-507/17,
and given that the relevant substantive law has not been harmonised in Case
C-18/18, the logical conclusion must presumably be that in the case at hand,
a blocking order may not apply EU-wide. It can hardly then be reasonable
to allow it  to be worldwide,  not  least  as worldwide orders per  definition
also are  EU-wide.  In other  words,  under  AG  Szpunar’s  reasoning,  where
the relevant substantive law has been harmonised, a court has jurisdiction
to issue orders that may apply EU-wide, and where no such harmonisation
exists,  the court  has  jurisdiction  to issue  orders  that  may  still  extend
EU-wide, and indeed worldwide! Such a conclusion certainly puts us at risk
of a “race  to the bottom”  and  seems  to undermine  important  safeguards
provided for in EU law.
4. THE RELEVANCE OF THE BRUSSELS REGULATION
Pointing to the CJEU’s decision in Case C-194/16 (Bolagsupplysningen),  AG
Szpunar correctly noted that
“the jurisdiction  rules  in Regulation  No 1215/2012  [the Brussels
Regulation]  also  apply  to disputes  concerning  the removal  of defamatory
content placed online.”19
In this context, AG Szpunar added the dubious observation that
“only  the interested  parties  entertain  doubts  as to the territorial  extent
of jurisdiction”.20
Making matters worse, AG Szpunar also stated that
18 See e.g.: Svantesson, D. (2015) Limitless borderless forgetfulness? Limiting the geographical
reach of the ‘right to be forgotten'. Oslo Law Review, 2 (2), pp. 116–138.
19 Opinion of Advocate  General  Szpunar in Glawischnig-Piesczek  (C-18/18,  EU:C:2019:458),
para. 83.
20 Ibid.
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“according  to the interpretations  put  on that  judgment  [eDate]
in the literature,  the forum  of the centre  of interests  may  adjudicate
throughout the world on the damage caused”.21
The “literature” by which he supported this statement with extraordinarily
far-reaching consequences is, however, limited to two works. While I hold
the views  of the relevant  authors  in the highest  regard,  marks  must
necessarily  be  detracted  for  such  an oversimplification  of what
commentators have said on this matter.
AG Szpunar’s statements seem to suggest that CJEU case law has already
conclusively  settled  the matter  of scope  of jurisdiction  in disputes
concerning  the removal  of defamatory  content  placed  online.  Such
a charitable conclusion is hardly justified.
Elsewhere,  I  have analysed in detail  what  Case C-194/16  (and the key
cases  that  preceded it)22 means  for  the question  of scope  of jurisdiction.23
To focus on one single matter, the entire premise of the CJEU’s conclusion
in Case C-194/16 is based on the notion that
“in the light of the ubiquitous nature of the information and content placed
online  on a website  and  the fact  that  the scope  of their  distribution  is,
in principle, universal […], an application for the rectification of the former
and the removal of the latter is a single and indivisible application”.24
AG Szpunar directly, and correctly, contradicts this, both in this Opinion,
and  in his  Opinion  in Case  C-507/17, by pointing  to the advantages
of removing  content  with  the help  of geo-location  technologies –
recognising  the relevance  of geo-location  technologies  necessarily
contradicts  the notion  that  an application  for  the rectification  or removal
of content is a single and indivisible application. This issue ought to have
been explored in detail, not sidestepped.
21 Opinion of Advocate  General  Szpunar  in Glawischnig-Piesczek (C-18/18,  EU:C:2019:458),
footnote 42.
22 Judgment  of 7  March  1995,  Shevill,  C-68/93,  EU:C:1995:61  and Judgments  of 25  October
2011, eDate Advertising GmbH, C-509/09 and Martinez C-161/10, EU:C:2011:685.
23 Svantesson, D. (2018) European Union Claims of Jurisdiction over the Internet – an Analysis
of Three  Recent  Key  Developments.  Journal  of Intellectual  Property,  Information Technology
and Electronic Commerce Law, 9, pp. 120–122.
24 Judgment  of 17 October  2017,  Bolagsupplysningen  OÜ,  Case  C-194/16,  EU:C:2017:766,
para. 48.
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Despite the profoundly confusing state of the relevant law, AG Szpunar
contented himself  with a brief  discussion of Cases  C-509/09 and C-161/10
and concluded that
“the court  of a Member  State  may,  as a general  rule,  adjudicate
on the removal  of content  outside  the territory  of that  Member  State,
as the territorial extent of its jurisdiction is universal.”25
Elaborating on this in a footnote, he claims that
“[i]t  is  therefore  a matter  here  of jurisdiction  known  as ‘global’
or ‘general’”.26
The whole idea that, as a general rule, the courts of a Member State enjoy
universal  jurisdiction  is  simply  incomprehensible  and  stands  in stark
contrast to public international law, and to traditional approaches to private
international  law. It  is  also a striking contrast to the sentiment expressed
by the European  Commission  in its  amicus  brief filed  in the controversial
Microsoft  Warrant case –  heard  in the Supreme  Court  of the United  States
on 27 February 2018:
“[a]ny domestic law that creates cross-border obligations – whether enacted
by the United  States,  the European  Union,  or another  state –  should  be
applied  and  interpreted  in a manner  that  is  mindful  of the restrictions
of international  law  and  considerations  of international  comity.
The European  Union’s  foundational  treaties  and  case  law  enshrine
the principles of “mutual regard to the spheres of jurisdiction” of sovereign
states and of the need to interpret and apply EU legislation in a manner that
is consistent with international law.”27
25 Opinion of Advocate  General  Szpunar in Glawischnig-Piesczek  (C-18/18,  EU:C:2019:458),
para. 86.
26 Opinion of Advocate  General  Szpunar in Glawischnig-Piesczek  (C-18/18,  EU:C:2019:458),
footnote 43.
27 European  Union  as Amicus  Curiae  in Support  of Neither  Party,  p. 7.  [online] Available
from:  https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-2/23655/20171213123137791_17-2%
20ac%20European%20Commission%20for%20filing.pdf [Accessed 2 September 2019].
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5. THE TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF A REMOVAL 
OBLIGATION
It  is  not  entirely  clear  what  AG  Szpunar  had  in mind  in his  discussion
(paras. 88–103)  of what  he  described  as the “territorial  scope  of a removal
obligation”, as opposed to the preceding section (paras. 82–87) he described
as addressing  the “territorial  scope  of the jurisdiction”.  Part  of the discussion
clearly relates to the question of scope of jurisdiction,  or scope of remedial
jurisdiction as Justice Groberman called it in a decision28 of the Court of Appeal
for  British  Columbia.  That  question  is,  however,  unquestionably  a part
of the noted  case  law  that  has  developed  in relation  to the Brussels
Regulation.
Further, AG Szpunar suggested that
“both  the question  of the extraterritorial  effects  of an injunction  imposing
a removal  obligation  and  the question  of the territorial  scope  of such
an obligation  should  be  analysed  not  by reference  to EU  law  but,
in particular, by reference to public and private international law, which is
not harmonised at EU level.”29
I  fail  to see  the difference  between  “the question  of the extraterritorial  effects
of an injunction”, and “the question of the territorial scope of such an obligation”.
And at least for me, AG Szpunar added to the confusion when he proceeded
to state that:
“In fact, there is nothing to indicate that the situation forming the subject
matter of the main proceedings may come within the scope of EU law and
therefore  of the rules  of international  law that  influence  the interpretation
of EU law.”30
Yet,  as noted  by AG  Szpunar  himself,  the situation  forming  the subject
matter of the main proceedings does, indeed, come within the scope of EU
law  in the form  of the Brussels  Regulation.  Logically  then,  the rules
of international  law that  influence the interpretation of EU law cannot be
disregarded in that setting.
28 Equustek Solutions Inc v Google Inc [2015] BCCA 265, para. 69.
29 Opinion of Advocate General  Szpunar in Glawischnig-Piesczek (C-18/18, EU:C:2019:458),
para. 92.
30 Ibid.
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Whatever AG  Szpunar  meant with this  section,  it  led him to conclude
that:
1.  the Directive  on electronic  commerce  does  not  preclude  a court
from  ordering  a host  provider  to remove  information
disseminated via a social network platform worldwide; and
2. the territorial scope is not regulated by EU law since in the present
case the applicant’s action is not based on EU law.31
While  the first  of these  conclusions  may  be  uncontroversial,  the latter
certainly  is  not.  AG  Szpunar is  here  apparently  conflating  the question
of applicable  law with  the question of jurisdiction.  The territorial  scope is
clearly regulated by EU law in the form of the Brussels Regulation.32
After  all  this,  AG  Szpunar –  in the end –  reached  a largely  sensible
conclusion:
“To conclude,  it  follows  from  the foregoing  considerations  that  the court
of a Member  State  may,  in theory,  adjudicate  on the removal  worldwide
of information  disseminated  via the internet.  However,  owing
to the differences between, on the one hand, national laws and, on the other,
the protection of the private life and personality rights provided for in those
laws, and in order to respect the widely recognised fundamental rights, such
a court  must,  rather,  adopt  an approach  of self-limitation.  Therefore,
in the interest of international comity, to which the Portuguese Government
refers, that court should, as far as possible, limit the extraterritorial effects
of its  junctions  concerning  harm  to private  life  and  personality  rights.
The implementation of a removal obligation should not go beyond what is
necessary  to achieve  the protection  of the injured  person.  Thus,  instead
of removing the content, that court might, in an appropriate case, order that
access  to that  information  be  disabled  with  the help  of geo-blocking.”33
(internal references excluded)
31 Op. cit., para. 93.
32 Perhaps AG  Szpunar mean to, in this section, solely address the matter of applicable law
in relation to decisions to remove content beyond Austria, but if so, it is surprising that he
discusses  which  court  would  be  better  placed  to rule  on such  removal  [see  Opinion
of Advocate General Szpunar in Glawischnig-Piesczek (C-18/18, EU:C:2019:458) para. 97].
33 Opinion of Advocate  General  Szpunar in Glawischnig-Piesczek  (C-18/18,  EU:C:2019:458),
para. 100.
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The warnings  raised  against  worldwide  orders  in this  paragraph,  and
indeed throughout the Opinion,  are crucially  important  and AG  Szpunar
deserves full credit for bringing these concerns forward. Yet, a fundamental
concern here is that AG Szpunar  appears to define the scope of jurisdiction
under  the Brussels  Regulation  independently  of international  law
considerations such as comity. He then introduces the comity consideration
at a later  stage.  However,  there  is  no  doubt  that  EU  law  is  bound
by international law, and therefore, the Brussels Regulation cannot be read
independent  of public  international  law  constraints  such  as the doctrine
of comity.  This  holds  true  whether  the applicable  law  is  EU  law,  is
harmonised by EU law, or is purely the national law of a Member State.
6. GEO-LOCATION TECHNOLOGIES
In relation to AG  Szpunar’s  sensible suggestion that courts may order that
access  to content  be  disabled  with  the help  of geo-location  technologies
in an appropriate cases, it is worth noting that, at the hearing the applicant
argued  that  such  measure  would  be  ineffective  due  to the possibility
of circumvention.
This is an argument that is made frequently. However, it is flawed,34 and
AG Szpunar’s response that
“[t]hose  considerations  cannot  be  called  into  question  by the applicant’s
argument  that  the geo-blocking  of the illegal  information  could  be  easily
circumvented by a proxy server or by other means”35
is encouraging. It is also fully in line with his Opinion in Case C-507/17 that
also endorsed the use of geo-location technologies.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the light  of the above,  if I  had  been  assessing  AG  Szpunar’s  Opinion
the way I  assess  student  assignments,  I  would have hoped this  was just
a first  draft  that  he  would  have  the opportunity  to rework  and  amend.
The reality is of course quite different. This will forever stand as his Opinion
in Case  C-18/18. However, as the CJEU’s judgment is still to come, the last
word has not  been uttered in relation to this  case.  A lot  is  at stake and I
34 See further:  Svantesson,  D.  (2017)  Solving  the Internet  Jurisdiction Puzzle.  Oxford:  Oxford
University Press, pp. 205–206.
35 Opinion of Advocate  General  Szpunar  in Glawischnig-Piesczek (C-18/18,  EU:C:2019:458),
para. 101.
400 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 13:2
hope  the CJEU  clarifies,  once  and  for  all,  that  a court  with  jurisdiction
founded  in EU  law  does  not  enjoy  unfettered  global  jurisdiction  just
because it applies national law.
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